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ABSTRACT
Today, many different types of scams can be found on the
internet. Online criminals are always finding new creative
ways to trick internet users, be it in the form of lottery scams,
downloading scam apps for smartphones or fake gambling
websites. This paper presents a large-scale study on one
particular delivery method of online scam: pop-up scam on
typosquatting domains. Typosquatting describes the concept
of registering domainswhich are very similar to existing ones
while deliberately containing common typing errors; these
domains are then used to trick online users while under the
belief of browsing the intended website. Pop-up scam uses
JavaScript alert boxes to present a message which attracts
the user’s attention very effectively, as they are a blocking
user interface element.
Our study among typosquatting domains derived from the
Alexa Top 1 Million list revealed on 8 255 distinct typosquat-
ting URLs a total of 9 857 pop-up messages, out of which
8 828 were malicious. The vast majority of those distinct
URLs (7 176) were targeted and displayed pop-up messages
to one specific HTTP user agent only. Based on our scans,
we present an in-depth analysis as well as a detailed clas-
sification of different targeting parameters (user agent and
language) which triggered varying kinds of pop-up scams.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Pop-up ads have been an annoying phenomenon on the inter-
net since the 1990s. This type of web advertisement puts the
ad banner into a separate browser window instead of directly
integrating it with the website [20]. The great popularity of
pop-up ads among advertisement companies contrasted with
the dissatisfaction of users because of the ads’ highly intrus-
ive nature. This eventually caused all major browser vendors
to implement pop-up blockers in their software in the early
2000s [7]. Today, websites rarely make use of pop-ups and
pop-up ads have disappeared almost completely from the
web (as browsers would block them anyway).
However, similar concepts are now being used for online
scams. Instead of displaying an ad or malicious content
in a new browser window through the JavaScript method
window.open,1 a new trend in web-based scams can be ob-
served: The JavaScript method alert2 is used to show a
short text message to the user.
Displaying the phishing message inside a JavaScript alert
box has one important advantage for the attacker: An alert
box steals the focus of the entire website. While normal ad-
vertisements can easily be ignored, alert boxes require the
user to actively click a button to dismiss them. This oblig-
atory interaction combined with the often short messages
creates an effective entry point to further engage the user.
This initial forced attention can then be exploited to lure
1 https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Window/open (last
accessed: 30 March 2019)
2 https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Window/alert (last
accessed: 30 March 2019)
the user to a dedicated website which serves the attacker’s
purpose, e. g. by asking for email addresses or credit card de-
tails. Attackers have also been observed repeatedly opening
alert boxes, trying to pose as legitimate OS error messages
and scaring the user into thinking that their device has been
infected by malware [12].
These properties make alert boxes a very effective and widely
abused vector for attackers. However, little attention has
been paid to the described techniques by the research com-
munity. Based on the Alexa Top 1 Million websites [2], we
created a list of websites with commonly misspelt names.
This set consisted of 485 642 valid, registered domain names,
which we scanned using automated browsers with five dif-
ferent user agents. In this paper, we present, to the best of
our knowledge, the first comprehensive, large-scale study of
the use of automatically displayed pop-up scams on websites
and analyse how different user agents and languages are
targeted by these campaigns.
In particular, the main contributions of this paper are:
• We present the first comprehensive scientific large-scale
study of the utilisation of JavaScript pop-up messages for
online scams on typosquatting URLs based on the Alexa
Top 1 Million websites.
• We provide insight into the goals and purposes of the
pop-up messages and the sites hosting them by manually
defining and assigning categories based on the message
content and the websites.
• Various distributions of the languages and the user agents
across the different distinct messages, websites and cat-
egories are visualised and detailed, in order to explain the
current state as well as trends in this particular delivery
method for online scams.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: We dis-
cuss related work in section 2 and give a technical overview
of the utilised framework in section 3. We present the results
of our research in section 4 and evaluate the scan results
in section 5, where we also present a large-scale analysis.
Possible future work is detailed in section 6 and section 7
concludes the paper.
2 RELATEDWORK
One important online scam category is phishing. It has been
around for a long time as one of the most effective social en-
gineering techniques and is a well-studied research area (see
e. g. [1, 13, 14]). Due to the fact that the majority of today’s
users have only limited technical and security knowledge,
the success rate of social engineering attacks is constantly
high. Moreover, adversaries are becoming more and more
creative in handcrafting their attacks to increase their success
rate. While traditional means of delivery (i. e. via email [18])
are still widely used, many other delivery methods exist.
Typosquatting [6] (also referred to as “URL hijacking”) is
a technique which is based on the concept of registering
domain names with typing errors and similar mistakes made
by users when entering a popular web address.
One of the first large-scale studies on typosquatting was
conducted in 2003 by Edelman [5], who discovered more
than 8 800 registered domains which were typographical
variations of the most popular domain names at that time.
His findings showed that most of those domain names were
traced back to one individual, John Zuccarini, who used
these typosquatted domains to redirect users to websites
containing sexually explicit content. Furthermore, he was
found to use particular tactics to trap the users from leaving
these sites, such as blocking the browser’s “Back” and “Close”
functionalities.
Typosquatting attacks are based on the insertion, deletion
or substitution of characters or the permutation of adjacent
characters in popular domain names [9]. Holgers et al. [8]
conducted an experiment in 2006 in which they measured
the effect of visual similarities between letters in particu-
lar domain names. At that time, their results outlined that
such homograph attacks were very rare and not severe in
nature. However, the increasing use of internationalised do-
main names (IDNs) as well as the rising number of malicious
IDN registrations over the last years show the increasing
significance of this typosquatting technique [11, 21].
Numerous other squatting techniques such as bitsquatting,
combosquatting, and soundsquatting were thoroughly re-
searched in the past. Bitsquatting is the act of registering a do-
main name one bit different than an original domain, which
might be accessed by users due to bit errors changing their
memory content. Dinaburg [4] performed an experiment
in which he registered 30 bitsquatted versions of popular
domains and logged all HTTP requests. His findings outlined
that there were 52 317 bitsquat requests from 12 949 unique
IP addresses over the course of eight months. Nikiforakis et
al. [17] conducted one of the first large-scale analyses of the
bitsquatting phenomenon. Their results clearly showed that
new bitsquatting domains are registered daily and are com-
monly used by the adversaries for generating profit through
the use of ads, abuse of affiliate programs and, in some cases,
distribution of malicious content.
Kintis et al. [9] conducted a study on combosquatting, which
combines brand names with other keywords in the domain
names. Their study showed that combosquatting domains are
widely used to perform various types of attacks, including
phishing, social engineering, affiliate abuse, trademark abuse
and malware.
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Furthermore, Nikiforakis et al. [15] presented a concept
called soundsquatting which takes advantage of user con-
fusion over homophones and near-homophones, i. e. words
which sound similar or the same, but are spelled differently.
To verify how much this soundsquatting technique is used in
the wild, Nikiforakis et al. developed a tool to generate pos-
sible soundsquatted domains from a list of target domains.
Using the Alexa Top 10,000 websites, they were able to gen-
erate 8 476 soundsquatted domains out of which 1 823 were
already registered.
Additionally, Nikiforakis et al. [16] conducted a study in
which they examined malicious JavaScript inclusions. Their
findings included a vulnerability which occurs when a de-
veloper mistypes the address of a JavaScript library in their
HTML pages. This would allow an attacker to easily register
the typosquatted domain which could then compromise the
website including a malicious JavaScript library.
Pop-up scam has not been researched in much detail yet.
Miramirkhani et al. [12] performed a large-scale analysis
of one particular type of pop-up scams, namely technical
support scams. Their methodology included a check for Java-
Script alert boxes. In Chou et al.’s work [3] the detection
of traditional (JavaScript-less) pop-up ads through machine
learning was proposed. The psychological aspects of fake
pop-ups on internet userswere analysed by Sharek et al. [22].
3 TECHNICAL OVERVIEW
To perform the large-scale scans required for this research,
we employed a modified version of theMiningHunter [19]
framework, which we initially developed to identify browser-
based cryptocurrency mining campaigns.MiningHunter is
based onDocker Swarm3 and consists of automated browsers
and a back end where the collected data is stored.
To scan websites at a large scale, a Chromium browser in-
stalled inside a Docker container is automated using the
Chrome DevTools protocol.4 It receives scanning requests
via a Kue5 job queue, automatically loads the website and re-
cords various details such as visited URLs. The accumulated
data is then sent to a back end container through HTTPS
and stored inside a MongoDB6 database for later analysis.
To scan a large number of websites within a reasonable time
span, multiple scanning containers can be active at the same
time.
3 https://docs.docker.com/engine/swarm/key-concepts (last accessed: 30
March 2019)
4 https://chromedevtools.github.io/devtools-protocol (last accessed: 30
March 2019)
5 https://github.com/Automattic/kue (last accessed: 30 March 2019)
6 https://www.mongodb.com/what-is-mongodb (last accessed: 30 March
2019)
For the purpose of testing we mimicked the most common
behaviour of an adversary, namely, we made use of a tech-
nique popularly known as “typosquatting”, as explained in
section 2. In our experiment, we applied this technique to
the Alexa Top 1 Million websites. To be able to cover the
broad spectrum of the web address permutations, we used
dnstwist,7 a tool which generates possible typosquatting
URLs for a particular URL. (At the time of performing this ex-
periment, dnstwist only generated permutations of URLs;
the tool’s functionality has since been expanded signific-
antly.) From the pool of thousands of possible address per-
mutations, we selected only those which were actually re-
gistered as valid domains (in total, we were able to generate
and verify 485 642 registered domain names).
For the purpose of this research, we developed two addi-
tional custom plugins for our framework. The first plugin,
UserAgentSpoofer, sends a configurable, fake user agent to
allow us to discern differences in behaviour which depend
on this HTTP header. The plugin replaces the User-Agent
request header in all requests sent to websites using the
Network.setUserAgentOverride method of the Chrome
DevTools protocol. The second plugin, AlertRecorder, stores
URLs and messages of all JavaScript alert boxes encountered
while loading and rendering a website. The data is acquired
using the Page.javascriptDialogOpening API.
Websites are scanned until the Network.loadingFinished
event is triggered by the Chrome DevTools protocol, plus
an additional second in order to capture alerts that appear
after the site has finished loading. The scan is also stopped in
case the Network.loadingFinished event is not triggered
30 seconds after beginning to load the website.
Using these two plugins, we performed five full scans of
our list of typosquatting domains based on the Alexa Top
1 Million websites. To be able to provide a wider variety of
targets, each scan used a different user agent. We selected
Chrome 69 (from 2018) and Firefox 46 (from 2016) to repres-
ent two popular, modern browsers running on Windows 10.
We additionally included Internet Explorer 11 (from 2015) on
Windows 7 to determine if any campaigns specifically target
Microsoft’s default browser for that OS. To cover the most
commonly used mobile devices, we included Chrome 69 on
Android 8.1 and Safari 12 on iOS 12 (both from 2018). De-
tailed information regarding all user agents selected for the
scans can be found in Table 1.
4 RESULTS
Our scans (utilising different user agents as described in
section 3) resulted in a total of 9 857 recorded alert boxes as
7 https://github.com/elceef/dnstwist (last accessed: 30 March 2019)
3
label user agent operating system browser
chrome
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWeb-
Kit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/69.0.3497.100
Safari/537.36
Windows 10 Chrome 69
ie Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; Trident/7.0;rv:11.0) like Gecko Windows 7 Internet Explorer 11
iossafari
Mozilla/5.0 (iPhone; CPU iPhone OS 12_0_1 like Mac
OS X) AppleWebKit/605.1.15 (KHTML, like Gecko) Ver-
sion/12.0 Mobile/15E148 Safari/604.1
iOS 12 Safari 12
firefox Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:46.0)Gecko/20100101 Firefox/46.0 Windows 10 Firefox 46
androidchrome
Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 8.1.0; TA-1053
Build/OPR1.170623.026) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML,
like Gecko) Chrome/69.0.3497.100 Mobile Safari/537.3
Android 8.1 Chrome 69
Table 1: The user agents used for the scans. “Label” is a unique identifier used throughout this paper when re-
ferring to the corresponding user agent. “Operating system” and “browser” refer to corresponding technology
implied by the user agent.
well as 8 255 distinct URLs and 222 distinct messages. 8 828
of the recorded alert boxes can be considered malicious. An
interesting aspect of our results is the targeting of specific
user agents, which is further detailed in section 5: 7 176
websites displayed an alert box only to one particular user
agent, whereas 1 079 websites showed messages to more
than one user agent. Considering only distinct messages, we
observed similar behaviour, although the difference is not as
prominent – 126 distinct messages were only shown to one
particular user agent, 96 to more than one.
5 EVALUATION
Using the categories described in subsection 5.1 as well as the
user agents shown in Table 1, we determined specific char-
acteristics of the recorded alert box messages with respect
to these features.
5.1 Categories
In order to determine which websites try to achieve similar
goals by displaying a message inside an alert box as well as
to enable clearer visual representations of the distribution
of message types across different user agents, we selected a
number of categories from our findings and assigned one to
each message.
Most messages in the Fraud category declare that the user
will receive some free credit to be used for gambling on the
according website if they register and enter their debit card
code, credit card information or similar data.
Messages contained in the Lottery category either claim
the visitor has already won a lottery or that they have a
particularly high chance of winning one. Such websites often
either require the user to play a “game”, such as spinning
a wheel of fortune, or to answer questions regarding the
prize (e. g. a smartphone). After completing such tasks, the
websites reveal that the prize is actually a “special offer” and
ask the visitor to provide their credit card information. Most
of the messages in this category are in German; we explain
this circumstance in subsection 5.4.
All messages in the category APK are in Chinese and most of
them urge the user to download a dedicated application for
displaying adult content. Unlike alert boxes in the category
Mobile Client, they do not redirect to app store websites,
but instead offer a direct download of an Android APK file
or redirect to an iOS itms-services URL. Several samples
were analysed using VirusTotal8 and were identified as po-
tentially unwanted programs (such as adware and spyware)
as well as Trojans.
Based on the characteristics of the alert box message content
as well as manual inspection of selected samples for each
distinct message, we consider messages inside the categories
Fraud, Lottery, and APK to be malicious (e. g. phishing).
Besides these malicious categories, we further defined vari-
ous non-malicious categories; they were differentiated by
content and message purpose in order to gain additional
insight into the reasons for showing alert boxes in general.
The category Errors contains several types of error mes-
sages, e. g. indicating invalid access tokens or JavaScript
errors as well as website maintenance and discontinuation
notices.
8 https://www.virustotal.com (last accessed: 30 March 2019)
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Figure 2: Number of websites targeting one
particular user agent
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Figure 3: Number of distinct messages per category
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Figure 4: Number of distinct sites per category
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Figure 5: Distribution of distinct messages over
different user agents in malicious categories
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Figure 6: Distribution of distinct sites over
different user agents in malicious categories
Messages categorised as Download urge the user to install
or update either Java or Adobe Flash Player and redirect the
user to the corresponding download area. Manual inspection
of the websites included in our scan which displayed these
messages showed that the alert boxes do actually redirect to
the legitimate websites of the software manufacturers.
Adult messages inform the user about adult content on the
visited website, ask the user to confirm that they are of legal
age and present the website’s terms and conditions.
Messages of the categoryMobile Site ask the visitorwhether
they want to display the dedicated mobile version of the web-
site.
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Mobile Clientmessages inform the user about the website’s
smartphone app and redirect the user to the according app
store website.
The categories Mobile Site and Mobile Client are com-
bined into the categoryMobile in diagrams throughout this
paper.
Messages of the Gambling category are related to gambling
websites. All messages are in Chinese, and most websites
hosting these alert boxes provide the latest results of the
Hong Kong Jockey Club’s Mark Six lottery9 as well as other
gambling information. They either require the user to re-
gister on a different website or present a special offer along
with an ID or contact number for instant messengers, which
are in widespread use in the People’s Republic of China.
Since the websites did not directly request credit card in-
formation or deceive the visitors in other ways, and since we
could not easily investigate the associated instant messen-
ger accounts, we chose to separate these messages into the
category Gambling instead of including them in the more
explicitly malicious category Lottery.
Misc categorises alert box contents which do not fit into any
other category and include short cookie policy statements,
welcome messages and password prompts as well as various
other kinds of miscellaneous messages.
5.2 Analysis
Our results show that a significant portion of the scanned
websites target visitors with mobile web browser user agents.
As Figure 1 illustrates, there are few distinct messages dis-
played only to a specific user agent. While the difference
in the number of messages only shown to one specific user
agent is not significant, there is a large disparity between
the number of websites focussing on desktop web browsers
and those targeting mobile web browsers in general.
Figure 2 illustrates the number of websites which displayed
an alert box only to one particular user agent. While some
alert boxes are legitimately directed at specific user groups,
the number of alert boxes shown only to desktop browsers
is almost negligible. We present some possible explanations
for the specific targeting of mobile users in subsection 5.1 as
well as subsection 5.4.
As we found many websites displaying alert boxes only to
users with mobile web browser user agents and a relatively
low diversity of messages (many of which are presented to
one particular user agent only), our findings indicate that
there are relatively few operators deploying their resources
on a large number of different websites at the same time.
9 https://bet.hkjc.com/marksix/ (last accessed: 30 March 2019)
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Figure 7: Number of distinct sites displayingmessages
in a specific language
5.3 Category Analysis
To make further analysis of the message content possible as
well as to simplify the identification of specific phishing cam-
paigns, we translated every message into English utilising
Google Translate. This allowed us to classify the messages
into the content categories described in subsection 5.1 re-
gardless of the original language.
Figure 3 shows the number of distinct messages in each cat-
egory; as the figure shows, the greatest diversity in message
content occurs in the categoriesMisc,Mobile and Errors.
While the majority of distinct messages belongs to legitimate
non-malicious categories, most of the recorded alert boxes
actually do fall into malicious categories. Figure 4 depicts
the number of sites in each category. The vast majority of
alert boxes belong to the categoriesAPK and Lottery, either
trying to trick users into downloading and installing smart-
phone apps outside of the controlled environment of their
OS’s application store or trying to trick users into providing
their credit card information by promising them some kind
of lottery prize. The large number of distinct messages and
websites in theMisc category is attributable to the scattered
characteristics of the messages in this category and is there-
fore not as significant.
Finally, we want to discuss the joint distribution of user
agents and message content. Figure 5 displays the number of
distinct messages shown only to a particular user agent for
each of the malicious categories (Fraud, Lottery, and APK),
whereas Figure 6 shows the corresponding graph for distinct
websites. Most malicious alert boxes were encountered while
utilising a mobile web browser user agent, while only a
small fraction of the websites showed alert boxes on desktop
browsers, at all.
Our findings indicate that the majority of websites in the
categories Lottery and Fraud targeted the user agents
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different languages by category
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Figure 11: Distribution of distinct sites over
different languages by user agent
iossafari and androidchrome (in that order), while the
websites in the categoryAPK exclusively targeted user agents
of mobile web browsers (for obvious reasons), with a strong
focus on the user agent androidchrome. The strong pref-
erence for targeting Android can be explained by the rel-
atively simpler process of installing apps from outside the
app store on Android phones [10], whereas installing apps
from unknown sources on iOS requires a more complicated
procedure (such as first installing an enterprise certificate
on the smartphone [23]).
5.4 Language Distribution
Since we discovered a number of different trends for tar-
geting specific user groups, we additionally analysed the
language distribution of the collected messages. As shown
in Figure 7, the vast majority of websites displayed messages
written in either Chinese (zh) or German (de). The main
reason for the large number of Chinese messages is evident
in Figure 8 and Figure 9, which show the distribution of lan-
guages over messages as well as websites in the different
categories: The category APK (which contains the largest
number of websites, cf. Figure 4) consists solely of messages
in Chinese, and several other categories have a relatively
large fraction of messages in Chinese, as well.
As Figure 8 shows, there are not as many distinct messages
in German across the different categories. However, Lot-
tery (which contains the second largest number of websites,
cf. Figure 4) consists primarily of messages in German (cf.
Figure 9). Based on “untranslated” parts (e. g. the currency
units) as well as hints of localisation such as a town name and
the name of a large German consumer electronics retailer
(especially in the category Lottery), we suspect that the
large number of websites displaying messages in German
is likely a result of localisation attempts based on the Aus-
trian IP address used for our scan. As mentioned in section 6,
further scans utilising IP addresses of other countries and
varying language settings are necessary in order to validate
this hypothesis.
The distribution of the languages across the different user
agents is depicted in Figure 10 as well as Figure 11. While
the number of distinct English messages is large, only a
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relatively small fraction of the websites displays these mes-
sages. In summary, our results show that most alert boxes
are displayed to visitors utilising web browsers with mobile
user agents as well as that the majority of those alert box
messages are in Chinese or German.
6 FUTUREWORK
Our work could be expanded upon in several directions. For
one, the detection of the targeting scope could be extended
to include more HTTP user agents.
Additionally, exploring the language- and location-specific
targeting further by repeating the scans with varying lan-
guage and location/IP settings (e. g. using VPN services)
seems likely to bring about further insight into location-
specific targeted phishing campaigns and effects on language-
specific message content (cf. the preliminary findings in this
direction in subsection 5.4).
The introduction of internationalised domain names (IDN)
in 2010 introduced new attack vectors beyond simple ty-
posquatting in the form of IDN homograph attacks, using
homographs such as Greek omicron ‘o’ or Cyrillic es ‘æ’; we
consider further research into the prevalence of IDN homo-
graph attacks an interesting subject of study.
Finally, the manual process of assigning categories to distinct
messages could be replaced by a fully automated classifica-
tion process utilising machine learning algorithms. A review
of the existing categories might be necessary, as well, and the
categorisation might rely solely on the message content in-
stead of including background knowledge. This new process
could establish a periodical automatic analysis enabling the
observance of developments and trends in pop-up scams.
7 CONCLUSION
Techniques similar to those used for displaying pop-up ads
in the early days of the World Wide Web are now used by
malicious websites to deliver online scam. JavaScript alert
message boxes steal the focus of the website, show a short
text message to the user and try to either lure or scare the
user into taking specific actions or exposing their data. Un-
fortunately, little scientific attention has been paid so far to
the techniques utilised by scamwebsites to gain the attention
of users and to retrieve data such as credit card information.
We performed large-scale scans of typosquatting URLs based
on the Alexa Top 1 Million websites via automated Chro-
mium browsers utilising a modified version of the Min-
ingHunter [19] framework. The scans with five different
user agents resulted in a total of 9 857 recorded alert boxes,
out of which 8 828 can be considered malicious.
Our in-depth analysis presented characteristics of web-based
scam campaigns and outlined target groups and goals of
the various attacks. It showed that a majority of websites
displayed a pop-up box to one specific HTTP user agent only,
and that most of them focused on mobile web browsers.
Different message categories were defined based on the mes-
sage content and the websites displaying an alert box con-
taining the message. The largest categories are Lottery and
APK, which are trying to trick the user by making them
believe they have won a lottery or to directly download and
install a potentially malicious application, respectively.
Another aspect of our analysis was the distribution of differ-
ent languages. We found that most websites were displaying
alert box messages in Chinese, followed by German (which
was most likely the result of IP-based location targeting).
Chinese messages often fell into the category APKand tar-
geted a mobile web browser user agent.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This research was funded by the Austrian Research Pro-
motion Agency (FFG) BRIDGE project 853264 “Privacy and
Security in Online Advertisement (PriSAd)” as well as the
Josef Ressel Center TARGET. The financial support by the
Austrian Research Promotion Agency, the Federal Ministry
for Digital and Economic Affairs and the Christian Doppler
Research Association is gratefully acknowledged.
REFERENCES
[1] Sherly Abraham and InduShobha Chengalur-Smith. 2010. An Over-
view of Social Engineering Malware: Trends, Tactics, and Implications.
Technol. Soc.32, 3 (2010), 183–196. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techsoc.
2010.07.001
[2] Alexa Internet, Inc. 2019. Alexa Top 1,000,000 Sites. (2019). http:
//s3.amazonaws.com/alexa-static/top-1m.csv.zip
[3] Yao-Ping Chou, Shi-Jinn Horng, Hung-Yan Gu, Cheng-Ling Lee, Yuan-
Hsin Chen, and Yi Pan. 2008. Detecting Pop-UpAdvertisement Browser
WindowsUsing Support VectorMachines. J. Chin. Inst. Eng.31, 7 (2008),
1189–1198. https://doi.org/10.1080/02533839.2008.9671473
[4] Artem Dinaburg. 2011. Bitsquatting: DNS Hijacking without Exploit-
ation. (2011). http://dinaburg.org/bitsquatting.html (presented at
BlackHat Security 2011).
[5] Benjamin Edelman. 2003. Large-Scale Registration of Domains with
Typographical Errors. (2003). (unpublished).
[6] Dara B. Gilwit. 2003. The Latest Cybersquatting Trend: Typosquat-
ters, Their Changing Tactics, and How to Prevent Public Decep-
tion and Trademark Infringement. Wash. U. J. L. & Pol’y11 (2003),
267–294. https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/
vol11/iss1/11
[7] Saul Hansell. 2004. As Consumers Revolt, a Rush to Block
Pop-Up Online Ads. The New York Times(19 Jan 2004), C00001.
8
https://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/19/business/as-consumers-
revolt-a-rush-to-block-pop-up-online-ads.html
[8] Tobias Holgers, David E. Watson, and Steven D. Gribble. 2006. Cut-
ting Through the Confusion: A Measurement Study of Homograph
Attacks. In Proceedings of the Annual Conference on USENIX ’06 Annual
Technical Conference (Annual Tech ’06). USENIX Association, Berkeley,
CA, United States, 261–266. https://www.usenix.org/legacy/events/
usenix06/tech/holgers.html
[9] Panagiotis Kintis, Najmeh Miramirkhani, Charles Lever, Yizheng
Chen, Rosa Romero-Gómez, Nikolaos Pitropakis, Nick Nikiforakis,
and Manos Antonakakis. 2017. Hiding in Plain Sight: A Longit-
udinal Study of Combosquatting Abuse. In Proceedings of the 2017
ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Secur-
ity (CCS ’17). ACM, New York, NY, United States, 569–586. https:
//doi.org/10.1145/3133956.3134002
[10] Martina Lindorfer, Matthias Neugschwandtner, Lukas Weichselbaum,
Yanick Fratantonio, Victor van der Veen, and Christian Platzer. 2014.
ANDRUBIS – 1,000,000 Apps Later: A View on Current Android Mal-
ware Behaviors. In Third International Workshop on Building Analysis
Datasets and Gathering Experience Returns for Security (BADGERS
2014). IEEE Computer Society, Washington, DC, United States, 3–17.
https://doi.org/10.1109/BADGERS.2014.7
[11] Baojun Liu, Chaoyi Lu, Zhou Li, Ying Liu, Haixin Duan, Shuang
Hao, and Zaifeng Zhang. 2018. A Reexamination of International-
ized Domain Names: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly. In 48th IEEE/IFIP
International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN
2018). IEEE Computer Society,Washington, DC, United States, 654–665.
https://doi.org/10.1109/DSN.2018.00072
[12] Najmeh Miramirkhani, Oleksii Starov, and Nick Nikiforakis. 2016. Dial
One for Scam: A Large-Scale Analysis of Technical Support Scams. In
24th Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS 2017).
Internet Society, Reston, VA, United States, 1–15. https://doi.org/10.
14722/ndss.2017.23163
[13] Rami M. Mohammad, T. L. McCluskey, and Fadi Abdeljaber Thabtah.
2013. Predicting PhishingWebsites using Neural Network trained with
Back-Propagation. In Proceedings of the 2013 World Congress in Com-
puter Science, Computer Engineering, and Applied Computing (WORLD-
COMP’13). 682–686. http://eprints.hud.ac.uk/id/eprint/18246/
[14] Rami M. Mohammad, Fadi Abdeljaber Thabtah, and Lee McCluskey.
2014. Predicting Phishing Websites Based on Self-Structuring Neural
Network. Neural Comput. Appl. 25, 2 (2014), 443–458. https://doi.org/
10.1007/s00521-013-1490-z
[15] Nick Nikiforakis, Marco Balduzzi, Lieven Desmet, Frank Piessens, and
Wouter Joosen. 2014. Soundsquatting: Uncovering the Use of Homo-
phones in Domain Squatting. In Information Security (ISC 2014, Lecture
Notes in Computer Science 8783). Springer International Publishing,
Cham, Switzerland, 291–308. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13257-
0_17
[16] Nick Nikiforakis, Luca Invernizzi, Alexandros Kapravelos, Steven
Van Acker, Wouter Joosen, Christopher Kruegel, Frank Piessens, and
Giovanni Vigna. 2012. You Are What You Include: Large-Scale Evalu-
ation of Remote JavaScript Inclusions. In Proceedings of the 2012 ACM
Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS ’12). ACM,
New York, NY, United States, 736–747. https://doi.org/10.1145/2382196.
2382274
[17] Nick Nikiforakis, Steven Van Acker, Wannes Meert, Lieven Desmet,
Frank Piessens, and Wouter Joosen. 2013. Bitsquatting: Exploiting
Bit-Flips for Fun, or Profit?. In Proceedings of the 22nd International
Conference on World Wide Web (WWW ’13). ACM, New York, NY,
United States, 989–998. https://doi.org/10.1145/2488388.2488474
[18] Tianrui Peng, Ian Harris, and Yuki Sawa. 2018. Detecting Phishing
Attacks Using Natural Language Processing and Machine Learning.
In 12th IEEE International Conference on Semantic Computing (ICSC
2018). IEEE Computer Society,Washington, DC, United States, 300–301.
https://doi.org/10.1109/ICSC.2018.00056
[19] Julian Rauchberger, Sebastian Schrittwieser, Tobias Dam, Robert Luh,
Damjan Buhov, Gerhard Pötzelsberger, and Hyoungshick Kim. 2018.
The Other Side of the Coin: A Framework for Detecting and Analyzing
Web-Based Cryptocurrency Mining Campaigns. In Proceedings of the
13th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security
(ARES 2018). ACM, New York, NY, United States, Article 18, 10 pages.
https://doi.org/10.1145/3230833.3230869
[20] Shelly Rodgers and Esther Thorson. 2000. The Interactive Advertising
Model: How Users Perceive and Process Online Ads. J. Interact. Advert.
1, 1 (2000), 41–60. https://doi.org/10.1080/15252019.2000.10722043
[21] Mike Schiffman. 2018. Farsight Security Global Internationalized
Domain Name Homograph Report Q2/2018. (2018). https://info.
farsightsecurity.com/farsight-idn-research-report (unpublished).
[22] David Sharek, Cameron Swofford, and Michael Wogalter. 2008. Failure
to Recognize Fake Internet Popup Warning Messages. Proc. Hum.
Factors Ergon. Soc. Annu. Meet. 52, 6 (2008), 557–560. https://doi.org/
10.1177/154193120805200610
[23] Min Zheng, Hui Xue, Yulong Zhang, Tao Wei, and John C. S. Lui. 2015.
Enpublic Apps: Security Threats Using iOS Enterprise and Developer
Certificates. In Proceedings of the 10th ACM Symposium on Information,
Computer and Communications Security (ASIACCS ’15). ACM, New
York, NY, United States, 463–474. https://doi.org/10.1145/2714576.
2714593
9
